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Chapter I: Introduction 
Human rights today are experiencing a watershed moment. Following its improbable rise 
in the twentieth century and zenith in the 1990s, the human rights regime is encountering 
significant challenges in the twenty-first century. Questions surrounding the regime’s perceived 
philosophical, structural, and practical flaws have led to serious concerns about its tenability. 
This has been exacerbated by an unfavorable political climate, making the defense and pursuit of 
human rights today an increasingly challenging endeavor. 
 Existing literature on this dilemma is in dissension on how to proceed. Responses range 
from arguments in favor of continuing in the image of the existing regime regardless of 
contextual shifts1, to allegations that these irreparable deficiencies are leading to the warranted 
“endtimes” of human rights2. Somewhere between these two rather extreme positions lies more 
moderate middle ground: concessions that some changes are needed to strengthen the philosophy 
and increase the effectiveness of a system flawed but not so fractured that it cannot be preserved, 
à la Emilie Hafner-Burton3. Through such an approach, cogent analyses help offer solutions to 
the difficulties facing the regime today.  
 In assessing these difficulties, one common critique emerges: a lack of “bottom-up” 
change. In the context of human rights, this entails disproportionate focus on institutional, top-
down human rights enforcement, as opposed to the human rights mentality within a society. Top-
down approaches without this mentality have proven themselves short-term at best and 
ineffective at worst. A solution to this deficiency lies in stimulating awareness and respect for 
human rights at the grassroots level, which can lead to the authentic dissemination of new human 
rights standards throughout a society. Such a transformation can normalize and legitimize what 
are often considered lofty, abstract, and/or alien precepts.  
                                                      
1 Carothers, Thomas, “Closing Space for International Democracy and Human Rights Support,” Journal of Human 
Rights Practice, 1-20.  
2 Hopgood, Stephen, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).  
3 Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, Making Human Rights a Reality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).  
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 How, then, to engender such a shift? One avenue is through education. Education has the 
potential to affect powerful change in societies, particularly post-conflict or post-authoritarian 
countries in political transition with mixed human rights records. It does so by facilitating a 
psychological transformation that leads to a new human rights mentality. At its most potent, this 
allows for an internalization of human rights that catalyzes new normative standards, social 
development, and political change4. Thus, increasing education in transitioning societies carries 
substantial potential for strengthening human rights.  
 From a human rights perspective, this would ideally be achieved through pursuing the 
right to education. Tellingly, however, the difficulties ensnaring the regime impede this 
approach. As a “soft” economic, social, and cultural right, education has been afforded less 
priority than its “hard” civil and political counterparts. In transitional societies with weak human 
rights enforcement and the absence of a strong human rights mentality, abstract moral arguments 
for the fulfillment of rights have proven themselves inadequate. Instead of relying on this 
approach, new ways of realizing education are needed. One such method can be found in a 
political conception of human rights, which looks beyond moral arguments to account for the 
factors that might inform the realization of these rights, bearing in mind that they are often in 
competition with state interests. This approach considers persuasion and incentivization, centered 
on state interest, as ways to induce greater compliance. Naturally, this invites certain ethical 
concerns, for instance that relegating the morality of human rights in their pursuit could result in 
an erosion of a regime occupied solely with its implementation. 
 The promise and the concern underlying this political conception of human rights are 
illustrated in the case of Cambodia. The Southeast Asian country has been in a state of quasi-
democratic transition since 1993. Both the democratic system and the human rights norms it 
adopted in its new constitution have consistently been called into question; since 1997, the 
                                                      
4 See André Keet, “Plasticity, critical hope and the regeneration of human rights education,” in Discerning Critical 
Hopes in Education Practices (New York: Routledge, 2014); Peter Seixas and Carla Peck, “Teaching Historical 
Thinking,” in Challenges and Prospects for Canadian Social Studies (2004): 111-113; Felisa Tibbitts, 
“Understanding what we do: Emerging models for human rights education,” International Review of Education 48 
(2002): 159-171.  
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country has been under the rule of a de-facto one party system5. Within this system, political 
freedoms have been curtailed, elections interfered with, and corruption proliferated. Education, 
however, has remained a top priority for the government, largely because of its potential as a 
socioeconomic tool that (until recently) underpinned its legitimacy. Much of the rhetoric 
surrounding this commitment to education is still steeped in human rights language, in keeping 
with what Sebastian Strangio calls the Cambodian “mirage” of democracy6. In reality, it seems 
expanding education has had little to do with the fulfillment of the right per se. Thus, a political 
conception of education has been successful in that it has facilitated expanded education, but has 
introduced an ethical dilemma by essentially permitting the Cambodian government to 
manipulate the rights regime for its own political sustenance.  
 How should these considerations be weighed? Are human rights stronger because more 
people have gained their right to education, or has the regime been further fragmented by its 
calculated misuse? Is development a viable vehicle for realizing rights, or might such a shift 
effectively contribute to the “endtimes” of human rights today? By examining theoretical and 
conceptual foundations of human rights and pedagogical education models, and reconciling these 
in the case of Cambodia, this work attempts to answer the following question, in two parts: (1) 
can education by way of a political conception lead to a more robust human rights regime in the 
twenty-first century, and (2) what might such an education look like in terms of curriculum and 
learning outcomes in transitioning societies? 
 The first step in answering this question is a literature review in two parts. Chapter II 
delves into the history, conceptual foundations, and contemporary challenges of human rights 
and the human rights regime. It identifies significant hurdles facing the regime today, and moves 
toward establishing a solution therefor through education. Chapter III presents two conceptions 
of education — as a right and as a welfare policy — before considering development as a useful 
point of convergence between the two in the contemporary political setting. Based on this 
reconciliation via development, education is proposed as a viable solution to the contemporary 
                                                      
5 Un, Kheang, “Cambodia: Moving away from democracy?” International Political Science Review 32 (2011): 547.  
6 Strangio, Sebastian, Hun Sen’s Cambodia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014): xv.  
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human rights dilemma. In Chapter IV, this inference is tested through a case study on the 
Kingdom of Cambodia, whose adherence to international human rights norms have fluctuated 
since they were adopted in 1993 but whose efforts in expanding education have remained 
remarkably consistent, and whose future, like that of the human rights regime, seems to be in 
flux today. Chapter V links the theoretical foundations of the work to the Cambodian case in an 
analysis that explores how development can act as a vehicle for rights; why education as a 
developmental tool carries particular potential in this regard; what kind of education precisely is 
needed to achieve this goal; what difficulties or impediments may be anticipated with regard to 
this new avenue; and how the potential of this approach is reflected in Cambodia today.  
 As this work remains in theoretical territory, intersecting at times with pedagogical 
models and second-hand empirical observations, its conclusions, too, are conjectural; in its 
current form, it can provide no categorical causality between education and strengthened human 
rights. However, what can be inferred from the evidence provided is that education has the 
power to facilitate a psychological transformation that results in an increased likelihood or 
probability of a human rights mentality that, in turn, can catalyze social and political changes 
which strengthen the regime. In this way, education can lead to a more robust human rights 
regime. Whether it does is a point I am interested in pursuing in future work, which would seek 
to provide a more conclusive correlation through on-site fieldwork and empirical analysis. 
However, this inference on the potential of education alone provides a compelling new avenue 
for fulfilling rights and strengthening the regime at a moment when it is urgently needed.  
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Chapter II: History, conceptual foundations, and contemporary challenges of human rights 
In this chapter, the necessary historical and conceptual foundations of the human rights 
regime are outlined before delving into challenges facing it today. By examining the origins, 
evolution, and contemporary strains of the regime, it is possible to move toward new avenues for 
solution regarding one of its most significant shortcomings: an inefficient and increasingly 
contested top-down approach to human rights, particularly in transitioning societies. Finally, the 
chapter examines an inverse approach via a focus on bottom-up human rights promulgation, and 
introduces education as a means for doing so. This brings us closer to establishing new ways of 
strengthening human rights in the twenty-first century. 
 
A very brief history of human rights 
For all their contemporary clout, human rights are relatively young. Although their roots have 
been traced back to ancient Greek philosophy and draw heavily on eighteenth century 
Enlightenment thinking, normative and legal human rights emerged only in the second half of 
the twentieth century7. The events of World War II, including unprecedented levels of systemic 
violence inflicted by states on their own citizens, provided a critical impetus for the 
establishment of an international protocol to protect the security and dignity of all people8.  
 The United Nations (UN), formed in 1945 on the tail of World War II, delivered such a 
framework with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth UDHR) on December 
10, 1948. The UDHR formally recognized the “inherent dignity and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family” and vowed to protect such rights by rule of law, albeit through 
voluntary participation by its member states9. The comprehensive list of indivisible rights set 
                                                      
7 See Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004).  
8 Donnelly, Jack, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013): 
75-92.  
9 United Nations General Assembly, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” accessed 9 January, 2017, 
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.  
6 
 
forth were anchored in individual freedom and the intrinsic worth of every being simply by 
virtue of their personhood. There would be no distinction between race, color, sex, language, 
religion, political association, or nationality. The UDHR envisaged a global community of 
individuals who maintained their diversity but coexisted peacefully, united by a common respect 
for every person’s right to life, liberty, and security of person.  
 This ambitious vision found remarkable traction amid a fragile post-World War II 
international order. In the decades since, human rights have become a prominent if enduringly 
contentious international concern with increasing normative and institutional reach. The apex of 
this development occurred in the 1990s; with the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet 
Union, and the proclaimed liberal end of history10, the human rights agenda reached new levels 
of scope and realization11. The human rights regime, for better or worse, has been linked to 
democratic governance since its formation. Thus, the rapid increase in democratization and the 
subsequent formation of a “New World Order” following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
engendered new levels of human rights institutionalization that led to the “ascendancy”12 of 
human rights.  
 
Contemporary challenges  
Though human rights continue to occupy a prominent role in today’s global politics, the 
robustness of the regime has waned. Amid intense scrutiny of its perceived flaws and shifting 
political trends, the human rights regime today faces significant challenges that are testing the 
legitimacy it established over the course of the twentieth century. Of these, three significant 
challenges can be identified: (1) limitations on enforcing rights and subsequent difficulties in 
deterring violations, (2) an apparent “post-global” drift from liberal internationalism, and (3) 
increasingly evident structural problems weakening the legitimacy of the system.  
 An intrinsic weakness of human rights is that they are intensely difficult to enforce. The 
                                                      
10 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).  
11 See Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004); Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2013).  
12 Hopgood, Stephen, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013): 4.  
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broadness of the regime’s agenda and the diversity of its beneficiaries, along with the noble but 
empirically exacting indivisibility of all rights, has always made the issue of compliance a tricky 
one. Along with the voluntary nature of UN membership, the great degree to which states retain 
their sovereignty under membership and the shortage of tenable human rights enforcement 
mechanisms means that definitive authority on human rights in any given country remains 
chiefly within the scope of the state apparatus. This is a great paradox of human rights: the task 
of protecting citizens from violations by a state ultimately falls to that same state. 
 Even amid growing institutional means and a rise non-governmental actors working to 
affect greater human rights fulfillment, the predominance of the state means that these rights 
constantly compete with state interests for their realization. Upholding rights thus ultimately 
rests on member states choosing, for myriad reasons, to abide by their responsibility to do so. 
This is increasingly challenging in a regime with drastic growth in membership and declining 
levels of commitment to the obligations thereof, which Emilie Hafner-Burton calls a 
“fundamental tension” of the regime today: 
“[I]t is both a successful articulator of global norms and yet also a gridlocked promoter, almost 
powerless to put its own aspirations into practice… Today’s system faces a crisis of legitimacy 
and relevance because it is packed with countries that have no intention (or ability) to honor its 
norms. The international legal system has only an observable impact on a slice of countries."13  
 Broadly speaking, there are two avenues for combatting this tension and effecting 
enforcement: coercion and persuasion. The former entails fear of punishment for noncompliance; 
the latter acceptance of the legitimacy and value of compliance. As the human rights system has 
settled into itself over almost seventy years of existence, flaws in its coercive mechanisms (e.g. 
international tribunals with very limited reach) have become evident, demonstrating that 
coercion alone is not a wholly effective solution. Persuasion on the other hand has considerable 
potential for increased compliance precisely because it goes beyond accepting the legitimacy of a 
right to recognizing the value that the fulfillment thereof could have for the state. Thus, it 
generates an alternative route to increased human rights fulfillment that works in tandem with the 
quandary of the human rights paradox.  
                                                      
13 Hafner-Burton, Emilie M, Making Human Rights a Reality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013): xvi.  
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 Another hurdle facing human rights in the twenty-first century is the extent to which the 
political winds have ceased to blow in their favor. The aftermath of World War II provided 
fertile ground for the establishment of of the regime; the spread of liberal internationalism and 
the rise of globalization at the close of the twentieth century were integral to the unprecedented 
levels of institutionalization and legitimacy that ushered in the golden era of human rights in the 
1990s. Today, it is apparent that the proclaimed “end of history” that this was supposed to 
represent was not an end so much as a juncture. History, as it was, trudged on. In the two 
decades since, global security concerns, fragmentation of the international community, and 
growing skepticism about the globalization phenomenon have contributed to a new new world 
order, in which the optimistic liberal internationalism so conducive to the rise of the human 
rights regime seems to have lost its ascendancy. Its ideas about an interdependent global 
community have been blunted by the resurgence of a strain of post-global neorealism, which, 
anchored in ideas about global anarchy and self-preservation, favors national interest over 
international collaboration and portrays human rights as untenably idealistic14. 
 As such, this revived realism presents a considerable challenge to human rights, 
exacerbating doubts about a regime already struggling to assert itself amid allegations of its 
serious structural deficiencies. In his rigorous analysis of the state of human rights today, 
Stephen Hopgood offers a dire diagnosis for what is ailing the regime: the regime itself. He 
defines it as experiencing an existential dilemma — a regime that has lost its purpose. Hopgood 
describes this dilemma unsparingly in the context of its institutions, which he deems “self-
perpetuating global structures of intermittent power that mask their lack of democratic authority 
and systematic ineffectiveness,” adding that the “grand narrative” that previously informed the 
regime has today been diluted to “an ideological alibi”15. 
 Hopgood also presents harsh philosophical critiques of the system, asserting that its 
“universal” human rights norms are in fact outdated European claims, whose underlying 
                                                      
14 See Duncan Bell, Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Martha Finnemore and Judith L. Goldstein, Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary 
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New 
York: Free Press, 1992).  
15 Hopgood, Stephen, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013): 1.  
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humanist morality is doomed because “in representing all equally it represents no one directly”16. 
These somewhat contradictory claims lead Hopgood to the conclusion that the foundations of 
such norms undermine their political effectiveness. This is compounded by the extent to which 
political power has shifted in the twenty-first century. Changes in global power structures, 
including the move toward realism described previously, have exposed how deeply human rights 
institutions rely on liberal state power for their enforcement. Hopgood claims this has revealed 
the extent to which the civil society sector today is not the independent, organic democratic 
organ it was conceived to be, but rather one that too often serves as a functional vehicle for state 
interests.  
 Taken together, Hopgood’s interpretation renders the human rights regime a hypocritical, 
capital-driven system with weak abilities and little purpose beyond its own perpetuation. In fact, 
he goes so far as to predict that in the twenty-first century we are witnessing the beginning of the 
“endtimes” of human rights as they have been understood thus far. Along with this rather gloomy 
pronouncement, Hopgood proposes an interesting alternative.  He offers a vision of human rights 
wherein the expansive system it has become is reverted to “a globally unowned and unownable 
claim of human moral equality as the anchor of fair treatment and nothing more”17. He suggests 
human rights can act as a “popular front” for more tenable forms of international activism that 
work to reduce suffering and improve daily life for people across the world. In this vision, “a 
syncretic, political, ground-up process of mobilization…. could even lead us toward more 
genuinely transnational social communities based on a shared economy rather than identity of 
ideology”18.  
 Though I find Hopgood’s diagnosis too cynical on the whole, there are important truths 
to his observations and there is valuable potential in his alternative. Instead of abandoning 
human rights as a viable regime altogether, it is possible to incorporate Hopgood’s criticisms in 
order to address the challenges that it faces today, and to consider how best to realize human 
rights for the simple purpose of reducing suffering and enhancing human dignity. By integrating 
                                                      
16 Hopgood, Stephen, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013): 3.  
17 Hopgood, Stephen, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013): 22.  
18 Hopgood, Stephen, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013): 22.  
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his points on the structural flaws of the regime, supplementing these with Hafner-Burton’s 
observations on enforcement, and affixing a consideration of the present political climate, I 
propose that a common critique and a plausible area for improvement within human rights today 
lies in the the need for “syncretic, political, ground-up” change that begins at the grassroots level 
and has the potential to disseminate through other rungs of a society, concluding in legal 
institutionalization. The inverse process — a top-down method of institutionalization that often 
does not fully resonate with the people it is meant to affect — is what the regime has practiced 
thus far, which has proven demonstrably ineffective: a flawed approach rendered unsustainable 
in a practical sense by a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. 
 If a solution to some of the serious shortcomings of the human rights regime today lies in 
cultivating bottom-up change, the challenge becomes finding a way to galvanize such shifts, 
particularly in transitioning countries with inconsistent human rights records. One such method 
can be found in education. 
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Chapter III: Education as right, policy, and development strategy 
Even at the peak of the human rights regime in the 1990s, normative and institutional 
recognition of education as a human right encountered considerable resistance. As a welfare 
policy, however, it has seen remarkable growth. Basic education has become an essential public 
good and a cornerstone of state-society relations, due in large part to a growing global demand 
therefore amid its demonstrable social and economic impact. Notwithstanding the frequent 
negation of education as a right per se, the widespread acceptance of the value and necessity of 
modern education entails extensive realization of an important provisionary right. Thus, 
education presents a compelling case of a “soft” economic and social right which has gained 
empirical traction by virtue of its political function. 
 In this chapter, the struggle for education as a human right and the growing eminence of 
education as a welfare policy are examined before being reconciled in the contemporary political 
setting within human development. The resulting hypothesis —  that establishing development as 
an intersection between rights and modern state-society relations can provide a more effective 
political conception of the right to education — is then applied to the challenges facing the 
human rights regime outlined in Chapter II, in order to bring us closer to answering the research 
question: can increased education lead to strengthened human rights in transitioning societies?  
 
Education as a right 
Education is enshrined under Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The first 
two points of the text, in full, are worth mentioning here:  
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional 
education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to 
all on the basis of merit.  
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
12 
 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.19  
 The first point is striking in its ambition, but the second offers insight into education’s 
potential for strengthening other rights and freedoms. This view was built upon by subsequent 
human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), ratified in 1976. Article 13(1) of the Covenant stipulates: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They 
agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the 
sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
They further agree that education should enable all persons to participate effectively in a free 
society.20  
  In this sense, the true facility of education extends beyond formal schooling to enabling 
individual autonomy. It is a vital right not simply because it allows for the acquisition of basic 
knowledge or skills, but because it engenders human development that protects an individual’s 
freedom by providing the necessary tools for successfully navigating life. This begins with basic 
primary education and literacy, but also includes employment, health, economic security, and 
civic and political engagement, culminating in greater dignity and freedom. As a right, this lends 
education considerable urgency and moves it from abstract moral territory to more substantive 
empirical conceptions. Richard Pierre Claude deems the right to education “humankind’s most 
effective tool for personal empowerment”:  
[F]or instrumental reasons education has the status of a multi-faceted social, economic and cultural 
human right. It is a social right because in the context of the community it promotes full 
development of the human personality. It is an economic right because it facilitates economic self-
sufficiency through employment or self-employment. It is a cultural right because the international 
community has directed education toward the building of a universal culture of human rights. In 
short, education is the very prerequisite for the individual to function fully as a human being in 
modern society.21   
                                                      
19  “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” accessed 9 January, 2017, https://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/. 
20 United Nations General Assembly, “International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” Treaty 
Series 999 (1966): 171.  
21 Claude, Richard Pierre, “The Right to Education and Human Rights Education,” International Journal on Human 
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 Nonetheless, education as a right has struggled to gain traction, even among countries 
known for championing rights who have adopted ICESCR and other instruments. To a large 
degree, this can be attributed to education’s status as a social, economic, and cultural right, when 
considered within the seemingly inevitable hierarchy of rights. Human rights are split into three 
classes: civil and political, social and economic, and cultural, known as first, second, and third 
generation rights, respectively22. Of these, civil and political rights, such as freedom from torture 
and the right to free speech, are afforded the most urgency and legitimacy. Second and third 
generation rights, though equally guaranteed under the regime, have been met with far more 
ambivalence. These include the right to economic participation, to desirable working conditions, 
to freedom of religion, healthcare, food shelter — and to an education.  
 Two primary justifications for relegating economic, social, and cultural rights are cultural 
relativism and minimalist theory. Cultural relativism, the main contender to universalism, holds 
that it is impossible to apply a universal standard to culturally nuanced matters such as 
education23. Minimalism ignores the indivisibility of human rights to insist that, given the 
daunting task of protecting human dignity across the world, it is unrealistic to expect every point 
in the UDHR to be made a reality for every last person, especially purportedly non-essential 
rights like education24. In this view, adopting a more modest approach by selecting a smaller 
number of urgent rights (usually civil and political) to concentrate on is a more pragmatic 
approach.  
 These arguments have found resonance, even among human rights adherents. Although 
165 states today are party to ICESCR, the extent to which this informs the educational reality in 
these countries is ambiguous if not outright limited. From Western countries with established 
education systems to countries in the Global South with less established systems and limitations 
for doing so, a serious gap persists between the articulated right to education and the degree to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Rights 2 (2005): 37.  
22 See Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2013): 40-42.  
23 See Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2013): 93-103.  
24 See Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 12 (2004): 190-213.  
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which it is pursued as such in member states throughout the world25. Nevertheless, access to 
education has grown over the past decades, spurred in large part by its role as a welfare policy.  
 
Education as welfare policy 
With the advent of globalization in the late twentieth century, there has been a fundamental shift 
in the creation of policy at the national level. Bob Lingard and Fazal Rizvi26 characterize this 
shift as one centered on neoliberal values and a rising global consciousness that blurs the line 
between external influence and internal policymaking. In this view, national policy has become 
inseparable from global forces; its creation, informed by a global economy and the relations that 
underpin it, is no longer exclusively the prerogative of the state. In short, policy today is 
developed at a complex intersection of local, national, and global processes and values. This is 
especially so in “developing”countries (countries in the Global South with lower gross domestic 
product and limited internal resources) where each of these forces compete with each other in 
close proximity in the form of external aid and involvement.  
This globalized policymaking matters greatly for education, which has come to occupy a 
prominent role as a qualifier for global competitiveness, a stimulant of the national economy, and 
a determinant of social status and mobility27. From a free market perspective, in a world 
increasingly distinguished by a competitive global marketplace, an uneducated population is a 
serious impediment to a state’s resources and global standing28. Within a state’s own borders, 
education is capable of shaping a society’s quality of life as well as the fiscal undercurrents that 
increasingly inform that quality.  
 How does one measure a concept as elusive as “quality of life”? The Human 
Development Index, established by the United Nations Development Program in 1990, acts as a 
                                                      
25 See Neera Chandhoke, “How global is global civil society?” Journal of World Systems Research 11 (2005): 355-
371; Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2013); Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From 
Commitment to Compliance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
26 See Bob Lingard and Fazal Rizvi, Globalizing Education Policy (London: Routledge, 2010).  
27  Lingard, Bob and Fazal Rizvi, Globalizing Education Policy (London: Routledge, 2010): 5.  
28 See Bob Lingard and Fazal Rizvi, Globalizing Education Policy (London: Routledge, 2010); Theodore W. 
Schultz, “Investment in Human Capital,” The American Economic Review 51 (1961): 1-17.  
15 
 
self-proclaimed “summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human 
development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of 
living29. “Standard of living” is measured it by gross national income per capita, reinforcing the 
notion that well-being is a corollary of economic prosperity.  
 This concept, which will be revisited later, sets the stage for a quantifiable measurement 
(and a comparative mechanism) which correlates economic development, good health, and 
satisfactory education with human development and well-being. Nations have overwhelmingly 
heeded this index; as education (“being knowledgeable”) falls under the “quality of life” 
umbrella, it too has gained near-ubiquitous legitimacy as a welfare policy. Across the world, 
education is widely touted as one of the surest investments a nation can make in itself. 
Supporting this view is human capital theory (HCT), developed by Theodore Schultz in the 
1960s. HCT holds that investing in a society’s citizens through education yields sustained 
economic growth, thereby improving citizens’ quality of life and the political and economic 
status of the state in question30. This notion was, and remains, particularly relevant for countries 
on the lower end of the HDI, often deemed developing.  
 To be sure, there has been controversy around this categorization, much of which 
summons relativist critiques of human rights. The notion that non-Western cultures with 
divergent lifestyles and values are simply works in progress waiting to be refined has been 
criticized as imperious. The development agenda itself, driven and ultimately controlled by “the 
power of the Western purse”31, has been accused of imperialism32. In spite of these critiques, 
development has seen great strides in institutionalization and legitimization. Its essential 
components (economic prosperity, health, education) are widely considered the keys to national 
                                                      
29  “Human Development Index (HDI),” Accessed March 1, 2017, http://udr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-index-hdi/.  
30See Theodore W. Schultz, “Investment in Human Capital,” The American Economic Review 51 (1961): 1-17; 
Adam Szirmai, Socio-economic development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).  
31 Sylvester, Christine, “Development Studies and Postcolonial Studies: Disparate Tales of the ‘Third World’,” 
Third World Quarterly 20 (1999): 703.  
32 These critiques are not without merit, but for the purpose of pursuing the stated research question with 
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culturally nuanced “soft” rights are concerned.  
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growth, security, and stability. The social and economic returns on education in particular are 
seemingly endless: reducing poverty, increasing income, boosting economic growth, making 
citizens healthier, more productive, more fertile, and less likely to die of preventable diseases, as 
well as fostering peaceful, equitable societies33.  
 In order to procure these dividends, many countries have moved to boost their 
socioeconomic status and HDI rank by investing in their human capital. Education has become a 
policy priority in countries pursuing a higher standard of living, greater financial weight, and a 
seat at the global table. Limited resources are often supplemented by foreign governments, non-
governmental organizations, and other parties, each with their own motives. Broadly speaking, 
recipient cultures are often open to this external aid, even when it is conditional on higher levels 
of subsequent external influence. This is a striking contrast to an otherwise common reticence 
toward perceived foreign interference in culturally nuanced areas such as education.  
 
Development as convergence  
The widespread acceptance of education as a welfare policy provides a marked contrast to its 
contentious status as a human right. Within development, it is possible to establish a sphere 
within which these two approaches might intersect. If policy today is largely crafted with the 
interests of the state in mind, and human rights are concerned with the interests of the citizen, 
then a point of convergence for these areas could be human development, which centers on the 
notion of improving a society for the well-being of its people and the prosperity of the state.  
 If HCT can be used to explain the political and economic advantages of an education, 
then the human development, or capabilities, approach provides an excellent framework for 
assessing its social benefits, as well as a starting point for understanding how these may overlap 
with human rights34. This approach, derived from the ideas of economist Amartya Sen, stresses 
that education is indeed the key to economic development; however, the latter is not the ultimate 
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goal of the former. Rather, economic development should be understood as a modern 
requirement for the sustained improvement of an individual’s well-being, so as to expand his or 
her capabilities. This, in turn, allows individuals to exercise freedom in the pursuits that they 
have reason to value, thereby fostering an ability to live in a way that respects and enhances their 
personal autonomy and human dignity.  
 With the human development approach, Sen returns the focus of education policy and 
economic development to human dignity, the cornerstone of human rights. He also offers a 
vision of human rights that addresses the relativist rebuttals of many economic and social rights. 
Instead of setting a top-down, Western-centric human rights agenda, education enables an 
individual to set and fulfill his or her own agenda in an organic, bottom-up manner. It provides 
the tools without constraining the outcome. Sen’s concept of freedom is not merely the lack of 
discernible restrictions, but the presence of viable choices. In this view, education is a qualifier 
for economic development and subsequent social conditions that facilitate personal autonomy 
and human dignity in the modern state.  
 Human development provides a link between policy and rights that has the potential to 
strengthen each of these areas. Considering the watershed moment human rights are 
experiencing, this connection could be of considerable value to the rights side of things. It 
presents a means for promoting and enforcing rights through persuasion — offering attractive 
incentives for a state to adhere to human rights in the form of political and economic 
advancement. Importantly, it is an effective approach. Despite the fact that education as a right 
has not seen great strides in international institutionalization or empirical exercise since 
ICESCR, more people are receiving an education today than ever before35.  
 Thus, there is potential for the political functions of certain rights, particularly those of 
the oft contested economic and social variety, to strengthen these rights in states where their 
enforcement is otherwise weak, particularly in the case of developing or politically transitioning 
countries with limited or mixed human rights records. This invites serious theoretical and 
practical considerations. Does focusing less on championing a citizen’s innate right to an 
                                                      
35 See Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, “The Global Rise of Education,” accessed 2 March, 2017. 
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education and more on emphasizing the ways a state can benefit from educating its citizens 
ultimately contribute to higher levels of education worldwide? Can this approach be applied 
methodically to other economic and social rights, such as favorable work conditions or paid 
maternity leave? Would doing so strengthen the human rights regime in the twenty-first century, 
or is there a danger that it could erode it? To begin to answer these questions, we must first 
examine the inference that education as a welfare policy and a developmental tool can strengthen 
education as a human right. To do so, we turn now to the case of Cambodia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
Chapter IV: Case Study - Cambodia 
Following a tumultuous and at times tragic struggle for stability in the twentieth century, 
Cambodia today is a curious case of progress and stagnation. The country’s new democratic 
constitution, rapid economic growth, and institutional developments contrast sharply with an 
apparently autocratic political reality and allegations of “backsliding” compliance with 
international human rights36. This Cambodian paradox, which Sebastian Strangio calls a 
“mirage”37, touches most corners of life in the country, including education. Since 1993, the state 
has adopted a vigorous commitment to education that is both ostensibly rights-based and 
development-focused — a commitment that has not wavered, even as the political situation has 
fluctuated.  
 This chapter attempts to gauge how the shifting political landscape in the Kingdom of 
Cambodia (KoC), from 1993 until today, has informed the expansion of the country’s education 
system and impacted its human rights situation. It explores the government’s approach to this 
expansion, and attempts to reconcile how this approach fits into notions of education as right, 
policy, and developmental tool. This provides the foundation for an analysis on how a political 
conception of human rights, with an emphasis on development and education, might be 
harnessed in order to provide new methods for human rights fulfillment that might augment the 
existing regime. 
 Following a brief survey of Cambodia’s post-independence path to “democracy” and a 
synopsis of the state of the state today, four notable political developments in the KoC, and their 
corresponding education initiatives, are explored: (1) the birth of the Kingdom amid heavy 
international involvement and conditionality from 1991 to 1993; (2) the short-lived early 
Kingdom, with its fragile coalition politics and striking coalescence around education, from 1993 
until 1997; (3) the prosperous and stable, albeit increasingly hegemonic, rule of Hun Sen and the 
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Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), in the early 2000s; and (4) the unexpected emergence of 
serious political opposition and dissent in Cambodia around and following the 2013 elections. By 
surveying the development of the education system in a chronological parallel with the 
progression of “post-authoritarian” Cambodia, a clearer image of the connections between 
human rights, development, and education in this paradoxical state may emerge.  
 
Cambodia today: “façade of democracy”? 
Cambodia, a country of rich patrimonial traditions in Southeast Asia, has had a whirlwind 
century. Following years of French colonial rule, the country declared its independence in 1953 
and, for the next forty years, seesawed between regimes. It was governed alternately by royal, 
socialist, and communist rule, in an unstable era marked by internal and regional conflicts as 
well as global ideological tensions.  
 The most infamous regime was the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) of the Khmer Rouge, a 
communist dictatorship of the 1970s which left the country’s institutions in tatters and accounted 
for the deaths of up to two million people — which, at the time, accounted for roughly one fourth 
of its total population38. The education system was a particular target during this era, as DK 
operated under the aspiration of transforming Cambodia into an anti-intellectual agrarian utopia. 
Teachers and intellectuals were murdered, schools were destroyed, and scores of Cambodians 
grew up in survival mode, with little to no formal education39. Following the short-lived but 
devastating tenure of the DK, a shattered Cambodia was largely sustained by Vietnamese 
occupation and Soviet support. Dismissed by Western countries for this association, the country 
faded from international prominence and reemerged on the international stage only in the late 
1980s, as the Soviet Union was collapsing and the United Nations turned a hopeful eye toward 
the small, conflict-ridden country.  
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 With UN support, negotiations began among Cambodia’s warring factions and the 
international community. This culminated in the formation of a new government, the Kingdom 
of Cambodia (KoC) in 1993. The KoC has formally operated under the designation of a 
parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy since then. The vast majority of this 
rule has been under the executive power of a former Khmer Rouge military commander, Hun 
Sen, and his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). Officially, the KoC has all the expected marks of 
a liberal democracy: elections (once every five years), checks and balances (executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches), and a number of different parties.  
 However, the reality of political life in Cambodia today does not reflect this purported 
transition. Kheang Un calls CPP’s rule a “façade of democracy”40 and characterizes its reign as 
one of hegemonic authoritarianism which has found continuity amid a growing stability 
following the country’s turbulent twentieth century. Today, the legitimacy of Cambodia’s 
elections have been frayed, if not eroded, and its checks on power — the legislature and the 
judiciary as well as civil society arms such as non-governmental organizations, a free press, and 
space for political protest — have been severely curtailed. Sebastian Strangio calls this 
phenomenon a shallow (but effective) “mirage”:  
Twenty years after the UN jump-started civil society in Cambodia, it lives on under Hun Sen as a 
mirage for the benefit of well-intentioned foreigners and donor governments. While Cambodia 
remains freer than many other Asian countries, the outcome is a purposefully selective freedom — 
a system… [that is] “open, but closed.” Indeed, few countries have seen such a wide gap between 
norms and realities.41 
 While the country has seemingly failed to stay the course on its political transition, it has 
continued to steadily grow its economy and expand its education system. The country’s 
floundering post-DK economy, which survived on assistance from Soviet bloc countries, 
received a massive boost from newfound international support as part of its democratic transition 
and has since rebounded at a striking pace. Between 1994 and 2015, Cambodia sustained an 
average economic growth rate of 7.6 percent — the sixth highest  worldwide, earning it the 
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designation of a “lower-middle income” nation instead of “low-income” in 201542. The country 
has a gross national income per capita of US$1,070, spurred by a flourishing garment industry, 
agriculture, and tourism43.  
 This wealth has not seen equitable distribution in Cambodia.  The economic reality for 
many Cambodians is one of scarcity. Roughly 40 percent of Cambodians remain on or around 
the poverty line44. Wealth is largely concentrated among 20 percent of urban-dwelling 
Cambodians, while the remaining rural percent struggle to stay afloat in a newly industrialized 
and increasingly expensive society45. This is exacerbated by high levels of political corruption 
among the upper echelons of government and society — which, in Cambodia, are often one and 
the same. Today, inequality is increasing, with many Cambodians juggling old inequalities and a 
rapidly shifting social and political landscape46.  
 In under three decades, Cambodia has gone from a depleted state eager for external 
assistance and acquiescent of the conditions therefor, to a fragile democracy with ambitious 
development goals, to a hegemonic but stable “tiger economy”47 with incongruous political 
norms and practices, to a state in possible abeyance, with increasing indications of social and 
political upheaval that could signal “turning point”48 in the Cambodian story. During each stage 
of this progression, the country has retained a commitment to modernization and development, 
notably through rebuilding its education system. Examining each of these stages in greater detail 
provides a basis for understanding how the situation has evolved, what might come next, and 
how human rights and education may factor into these developments.  
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“Fictitious reconciliation” and the 1993 election 
Cambodia in the late 1980s and early 1990s was in disarray. The Soviet bloc support that had 
sustained it for the past decade evaporated with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The country’s 
Vietnamese-occupied communist regime led to a diplomatic and economic estrangement from 
much of the international community, and infighting between vestiges of each of the former 
regimes led to widespread instability. Amid these precarious conditions, the international 
community stepped in. 
 The Comprehensive Cambodian Peace Agreement, known as the Paris Peace Agreement 
(PPA), was signed on October 23, 1991, following three years of negotiations. Under the 
auspices of the United Nations and with support from the international community, it outlined a 
course for the country’s path forward in three parts: (1) definitively settling the political conflict; 
(2) reaching consensus on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity; and (3) facilitating 
the country’s rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
 The first step to achieving this was the “free and fair” election of a new government that 
would put Cambodia on the path to lasting political stability. The agreement stipulated a period 
of temporary international rule by United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
meant to provide a period of political neutrality conducive to a successful transition. 
Considerable emphasis was placed on rebuilding and developing a country ravaged by years of 
internal conflicts and financially crippled by a period of severely limited foreign assistance. The 
agreement urged the international community to assist Cambodia in these efforts through 
generous economic and financial assistance. Additionally, PPA invoked a human rights agenda 
for the first time in modern Cambodian history and stipulated the country’s compliance thereto.49  
 In keeping with this new responsibility, Cambodia included the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in its 1993 constitution, and has since ratified eighteen additional human rights 
instruments50. In this way, human rights in Cambodia were not born of a demand by the 
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Cambodian people for the recognition of their own rights. Rather, the advent of democratic, 
human rights-focused norms emerged through a reluctant concession by Cambodian officials 
with little to no choice in the matter:  
Cambodia’s warring factions had few options but to agree…. With a shattered state, no money, 
few remaining foreign supporters… the Khmer leaders came to the negotiating table with few 
reliable options…. Cambodia had little choice but to accept the imperatives of international 
donors. With virtually nothing — money, infrastructure, means of communication, or adequately 
skilled human resources — the atmosphere of cooperative needs assessment envisioned by the 
declaration was more akin to a beggar, empty bowl in hand, seeking assistance from a wealthy 
benefactor51.  
 Ayres goes so far as to label the agreement a “fictitious reconciliation” — both in terms 
of Cambodia’s supposed transition to democracy, and with regard to the human rights standards 
it was now formally tasked with upholding. Neither democracy nor human rights were called for 
or insisted upon by the greater public. Rather, they were part of what Caroline Hughes describes 
as a “democratic mandate”52 which outlined the conditions for a UN sanctioned (and financed) 
transition.  
 Despite the purported fictitiousness of the agreement, it nonetheless resulted in the 
country’s first “free and fair” democratic election in May 1993. The UN-administered elections 
saw Hun Sen’s ruling CPP defeated at the ballot by Prince Norodom Ranariddh’s royalist 
Funcinpec party. As it was, Hun Sen refused refused to concede and threatened a new civil war. 
Following talks between the two leaders, a coalition government was established that appointed 
Ranariddh and Hun Sen as first and second prime minister, respectively. The Kingdom of 
Cambodia (KoC), the first democratically established government, was born.  
 
Early Kingdom, early reform  
The early years of the KoC under coalition rule was marked by administrative tension and a 
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fragmented ideology that reflected the inorganic formation of its new regime. Neither the 
egalitarianism nor the pluralism envisioned by the United Nations was championed by either of 
Cambodia’s new prime ministers following the election. Each of the coalition parties kept an 
uneasy eye trained on the other. It was clear that this was not the harmonious, democratically-
oriented state the UN had hoped to establish.  
 There was, however, one element of the UN vision around which both parts of the 
Cambodian administration — and the international community — coalesced with equal 
enthusiasm: a commitment to development, or what Ayres calls “developmentalism”53. 
Rehabilitating a country fractured by waves of tumult over the past decades through concentrated 
modernization became a defining and uniting goal in Cambodia. This modernization primarily 
centered on economic reforms which embraced free market principles, human resource 
development, and the post-Cold War “New World Order” (NWO)54.  
 The first notable legislative result of this new Cambodian commitment to 
developmentalism can be found in the 1994 National Plan to Rehabilitate and Develop 
Cambodia (NPRD). The plan introduced six “fields of operation” aimed at facilitating a strong 
private sector and international trade through market-driven economic reforms, and whose 
predicted profits would be used to rebuild the country’s infrastructure and effectuate social 
development55. One element of NPRD was a focus on the development of “human resources,” 
which can be likened to Theodore Schultz’ notion of human capital — that is, an emphasis on 
education for development (see page 15). Education became a popular rallying point for a 
Cambodian government otherwise reticent about the international norms it was now tasked with 
implementing:  
These norms, based on notions of increased efficiency in the use of resources, qualitative renewal, 
and improved sectoral management… were willingly and enthusiastically embraced by the 
Cambodian government, which proudly boasted as fundamental development priorities the 
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“sustainable development of human resources” and “sustainable economic growth.”56  
 KoC’s education reforms were, from the beginning, centered on improving educational 
quality and access for the purpose of development, and continued to operate with high levels of 
international involvement and support. An important policy framework, Rebuilding Quality 
Education and Training in Cambodia, was introduced in early 1994. It mandated nine years of 
modernized basic education for all Cambodian youth, and drew explicit connections between 
(formal and non-formal) education, successful employment, and economic development57.  
 With these economic and educational reforms, the framework for Cambodia’s growth 
was established. Nevertheless, politically, the country was far from settled. Despite the 
encouraging coalescence around development in Cambodia, the tension simmering under its ill-
matched coalition government and ensuing “fictitious” democratization remained, and eventually 
boiled over. On July 5, 1997, Hun Sen appeared on Cambodian television accusing Ranariddh, 
who was out of the country, of illegal collaboration with the Khmer Rouge. That evening, 
conflict broke out between troops alternately loyal to the first and second prime minister. By July 
7, Hun Sen was in control of the capital city Phnom Penh..  
 With the forcible removal of Ranariddh and the upending of the “free and fair” results of 
the 1993 election, the Cambodian democracy as the UN and the PPA had envisioned it was 
seemingly finished. However, Hun Sen, no doubt aware of the political and financial 
ramifications of conceding this reality, insisted that democracy was alive and well. He claimed 
the coup was not a coup at all, but rather a legitimate transfer of power within what should still 
be considered a democratic state. He also insisted that the alliance between the CPP and 
Funcinpec remained. In reality, under his orders dozens of Funcinpec officials were summarily 
executed immediately following the upheaval. With this telling event, the “mirage” of 
democratic rule under the CPP was born.  
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Twenty-first century “mirage” and Education for All  
As Hun Sen attempted to validate his recouped reign and the world slid into the twenty-first 
century, Cambodia began to see significant yields of its 1990s “developmentalism.” The 
Cambodian economy flourished, and has showed little sign of slowing since. The economic 
reforms and the industrial investments led to remarkable — and remarkably consistent — levels 
of economic growth. From the time NPRD was adopted in 1994 to when the World Bank 
elevated it from a low-income to a lower-middle income nation in 2015 (a goal the country had 
set itself for 2030), Cambodia sustained an average growth grade of 7.6 percent — the sixth 
highest worldwide58.  
 As this developmentalism yielded profitable returns and the country settled into a peace 
that had been sorely lacking over the past several decades, Hun Sen garnered substantial political 
support in Cambodia. He won the 1998, 2003, and 2008 elections with an average percent of 
48.959. Internationally, Hun Sen deftly navigated diplomatic hurdles and international 
obligations, using the democratic “mirage” to present an image of Cambodia to the world that 
generally appeased its foreign donors and the international community at large. This internal and 
external legitimacy endured even as the actual quality of democracy in Cambodia continued to 
decline. Competitive elections, civic space, and freedom of the press were increasingly curtailed, 
including through political suppression, violence, and extrajudicial imprisonment. The checks on 
power established with the new constitution increasingly appeared devoid of any real, 
independent authority, but rather functioned as an extension of Hun Sen’s rule60. 
 Despite these divergences from the Cambodia envisioned by the PPA, the CPP 
maintained the commitment to education born with this framework. One notable piece of 
legislation resulting from this was the Education for All (EFA) plan61, which introduced an 
ambitious agenda for education reform between 2003 and 2015 with the goal of further 
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stimulating development. The primary policy objectives of EFA focus on ensuring equitable 
access to basic education, improving educational quality, and decentralizing the educational 
system so as to tailor it to the diverse needs of students in varying regions. In a preface to the 
document, Hun Sen himself provides a spirited espousal of the reforms in which he not only 
reiterates CPP’s commitment to education as a way to strengthen social and economic 
development, but also to its “strong commitment”62 to its human rights obligations, an assertion 
contradicted by its increased restriction of other rights and freedoms.  
Nonetheless, under the party line of development and rights, and through plans like EFA, 
education has been expanded considerably. The most significant progress has been made in 
improving access; by 2011, access to primary education was at 95.2 percent, with 95.8 percent 
for boys and 94.6 percent for girls — making access near-universal and significantly decreasing 
Cambodia’s gender gap63. Serious problems persist concerning quality and retention; the literacy 
rate hovers around 70 percent, and only 47.9 percent of Cambodian students complete lower-
secondary education, which comprises part of Cambodia’s nine-year basic education64. But with 
a steady commitment by the Cambodian government and considerable aid from foreign donors, 
the formerly decimated education system has seen considerable expansion since 1993. 
 So the first decade of the twenty-first century went in Cambodia, with strong economic 
growth, some social development, relative peace, and increasingly hegemonic rule. Judging by 
the CPP’s political support, Cambodians seemed content enough with the status quo, which 
afforded the country a long sought-after stability. By all accounts, this imperfect status quo might 
have continued into the new century — until it didn’t.  
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The 2013 elections and the rise of political dissent  
On July 28, 2013, the Cambodian general elections dealt a blow to Hun Sen’s rule and the 
Cambodian status quo. In results that seemed to take the country by surprise, the CPP lost the 
largest number of National Assembly seats in fifteen years, leaving it with 68 (down from 90) 
and giving 55 to the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), which was formed 
only in the previous year65. These results were crippling enough to a party that had until this 
point held such a comfortable majority; widespread allegations of election fraud and claims by 
the CNRP that they were cheated out of victory suggests that they might have been altogether 
crushing had the democratic process been allowed to unfold undisturbed66.  
 This was a shocking turn of events for Hun Sen and the CPP, who had been convinced of 
their continued dominance, and a notable departure from Cambodians’ previous support for the 
party in the name of stability and prosperity. But the shift did not take place overnight, and it was 
not quelled with the (official) election outcome in 2013. Cambodians, disenchanted with 
corruption and persistent inequality, driven from rural homes to new urban settings for 
employment opportunities, and equipped with more knowledge and different expectations for 
their own standard of living, had begun to push back against the CPP’s democratic façade. 
Protests against the results continued long after July 28, 2013, and calls for change have 
persisted, with many eyes trained on the 2018 elections.  
 Hun Sen, clearly dismayed by these developments, attempted to assuage public 
discontent by promising a series of reforms meant to appeal to voters. This included an apparent 
rebranding of education efforts. In a 2015 review and addition to the EFA plan, the rhetoric 
emphasized the state’s continued commitment to “heavily”67 invest in education for the purpose 
of benefitting Cambodian people as well as the economy68. The document detailed government 
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plans for harnessing “all the potential of Cambodia’s demographic dividend” to reduce poverty 
and improve living standards — and, of course, “to ensure a favorable socio-economic 
development”69. The new plan, this time designated for 2014-2018, committed itself to 
improving educational quality and standards alongside access70. It focused specifically on 
improving learning conditions and opportunities for young adults — who had made up nearly 37 
percent of the vote in 201371 —  and underlined the international partnerships and funding it was 
receiving to do so.  
 The 2013 elections and the rise of political dissent in Cambodia have sparked hopeful 
sentiment among human rights supporters that they have ushered in a “turning point” in 
Cambodian society72. Hun Sen’s post-election attempts to woo erstwhile supporters who no 
longer seemed content with high national economic growth and modernization seem to indicate 
moves toward a more genuine form of democracy. But whether this dissent will persist at similar 
levels into the future, whether Hun Sen’s promises of reform are anything more than an 
extension of his mirage, and what will happen in the 2018 elections remains to be seen.  
 
Summarizing changes 
Since 1993, Cambodia has committed to expanding and improving its formerly decimated 
education system. The focus of this improvement lies primarily in increasing equitable access to 
education, improving the system’s quality and retention rate, and providing its recipients with 
tools for greater productivity and social mobility. This commitment is reflected less in the state’s 
own internal expenditures, which are comparatively low, even among developing countries in the 
region73. Rather, it is apparent when measured against the historical and political context of the 
                                                      
69 “Education for All 2015 National Review Report: Cambodia,” accessed 3 May, 2017, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002297/229713E.pdf/: 1.  
70 “Education Strategic Plan 2014-2018,” accessed 16 May, 2017, https://www.veille/univ-ap.info/media/pdf/pdf-
1436325627550.pdf/.  
71 Strangio, Sebastian, Hun Sen’s Cambodia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014): 259.  
72 Mortensen, Carol, “Political Economy Analysis of Civic Space in Cambodia: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Active Citizenship,” Oxfam International (2015): iii.  
73 “Cambodia - Expenditures on Education - Public spending on education as a share of gross domestic product,” 
accessed 17 May, 2017, https://knoema.com/atlas/Cambodia/topics/Education/Expenditures-on-Education/Public-
31 
 
Cambodian state — specifically, the extent to which the country has relaxed its otherwise strict 
protectionism of cultural institutions in favor of educational modernization.  
 This embrace of international frameworks, standards, and collaboration in the pursuit of 
education reform is a serious anomaly in the Cambodian context, particularly when considering 
the continuity with which it has been sustained and the degree to which this contrasts with 
concurrent political trends. Cambodia’s new, open approach to education was born of its 
“transition” to democratic, rights-abiding statehood in the early 1990s. Even as Cambodia has 
slipped into a system more indicative of autocracy than democracy and has been increasingly 
flagged for failing to fulfill its human rights obligations, it has remained steadfast in this 
commitment to education.  
 Why this continued support? In considering the circumstances that led to the adoption of 
democratic rule and human rights in Cambodia, embracing education reform arguably never had 
much to do with human rights in the first place, despite proclamations to the contrary. Neither 
part of the shaky coalition government established in 1993 seemed driven by a profound moral 
respect for human rights, or a duty to uphold them. In fact, the inclusion of international human 
rights standards in the new constitution seemed propelled not by political support or public 
demand therefor, but rather because of an external conditionality imposed on a desperate state.  
 The state’s enthusiasm for education reform appears to have been rooted almost 
exclusively in a desire for development. In the early years, the government saw education as a 
developmental tool with great potential and embraced it as such, international strings attached 
and all. Today, even as the state’s existing progress on education has indeed moved to fulfill this 
development potential, it seems that the focus has shifted from development per se to something 
else. Education and the development derived from it have remained at the top of the government 
agenda because together they serve a crucial political function: generating a level of economic 
growth that has, until recently, ensured the regime’s domestic and international legitimacy.  
 The socioeconomic dividends wrought by education over the past twenty-five years in 
Cambodia seem to have played a part in perpetuating an increasingly imperfect status quo within 
                                                                                                                                                                              
spending-on-education-as-a-share-of-GDP/.  
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its borders — one that requires sustained growth for its continuation74. The high rate of economic 
growth and the relative stability that the country has enjoyed since the early 2000s led to 
widespread support for the ruling CPP, even as political freedom and other rights were curtailed. 
Similarly, in a global context much of Cambodia’s legitimacy is derived from the notion that it 
continues to develop in the free-market fashion envisaged by the UN in the early 1990s, and that 
it does so in the spirit of international cooperation and with its human rights obligations in mind.  
 The government keeps this narrative alive even as its actions contradict it, insisting on its 
compliance with human rights norms and laws and pointing to its economic growth as proof of 
its ongoing modernization. Until recently, this approach appeared to be working; Cambodia 
faced nominal pressure both internally and externally. It is quite likely that without such strong 
growth, the CPP would be unable to sustain the (increasingly contested) legitimacy it maintains. 
Thus, its steadfast commitment to education over the past two decades, often portrayed as the 
fulfillment of rights obligations and an investment in the country’s “human resources,” today 
appears principally anchored in a desire for socioeconomic development for the primary aim of 
retaining political rule. Rather than an end, development has itself become a political mean.  
 To reconcile these events with theoretical considerations of human rights and begin to 
extract a method for strengthening rights through education in transitioning societies like 
Cambodia, we must examine in greater detail how development can facilitate greater rights 
fulfillment, how education in particular can strengthen the regime in new and sustainable ways, 
and what these considerations, taken together, illustrate about the future of human rights in 
Cambodia and beyond.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
74 See Kheang Un, “Cambodia: Moving away from democracy?” International Political Science Review 32 (2011).  
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Chapter V: Analysis 
It appears that in Cambodia today, human rights predominantly constitute a diplomatic 
fig leaf for socioeconomic development. This development is not merely driven by a desire to 
develop per se, but by the political legitimacy derived therefrom by a hegemonic ruling party. 
Without minimizing this unfavorable state of affairs, it is worth exploring how these elements 
may be harnessed and rearranged in a way that is beneficial to rights. It is possible, for instance, 
for development to act as a vehicle for certain rights in societies where they are not embraced as 
such. Given the difficulty of enforcing rights in Cambodia by virtue of their status as such, 
development can be considered as a useful entry point for expanding education, even if a moral 
concern for human rights is not the immediate motivation. The fulfillment of the right, after all, 
is still fulfillment. Without dismissing the ethical considerations that this approach invites, there 
is an argument to be made that the potential of education is significant enough to merit 
realization through more pragmatic, even ostensibly transactional, avenues. The benefits of this 
alternate approach may in fact offer new ways to not only realize human rights but to strengthen 
the regime as a whole.  
 Using the case presented in Chapter IV, Chapter V analyzes the Cambodian situation in 
the context of politically-conceived human rights. It delves further into the notion that 
development may provide a new avenue for human rights fulfillment in the twenty-first century, 
including a critical ethical appraisal that explores the drawbacks and risks of such an approach. It 
emphasizes how and why the fulfillment of education specifically could be beneficial to the 
human rights system: namely, that education possesses a unique potential for strengthening 
rights and freedoms, particularly in transitional societies like Cambodia. This potential lies in the 
facilitation of a psychological transformation that may catalyze new social norms, increased 
civic engagement, and more society-wide respect for human rights. Such a transformation can be 
stimulated through the inclusion of human rights education as part of a country’s curriculum. 
The chapter provides a specific pedagogical framework for this type of human rights education, 
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and explores the benefits and limitations of its application in transitional societies. Finally, the 
Cambodian case is revisited for a preliminary evaluation of this approach, and what it could 
mean for human rights in the twenty-first century.   
 
Development as a vehicle for rights  
In an effort to become economically viable and internationally legitimate, the Cambodian 
government has embraced education as a fundamental aspect of its modern statehood. In doing 
so, it has accepted many of the conditions, frameworks, and priorities of a number of external 
parties, many of which are rooted in a rights-based approach to education. The government,  
keenly aware of the legitimacy it derives from (the appearance of) human rights compliance, 
continues to declare human rights a primary motivation for its commitment to education, an 
assertion that is becoming increasingly difficult to accept given the regime’s indifference toward 
myriad other rights. The true motivation appears to be development, both for its immediate 
socioeconomic returns and for the political legitimacy it has bestowed on the government. 
Nonetheless, the state continues to put a premium on education, resulting in considerable strides 
in its reformation and expansion over the past two decades.  
 The benefits of utilizing development for the purpose of furthering human rights is 
grounded in the idea that the two are linked by their interest in increasing human opportunity, as 
well as the notion that they are often mutually beneficial in this pursuit75. Beyond this, the 
Cambodian case seems to indicate that there is also potential for development to not only act as a 
reinforcer of human rights, but to actually provide an entrance therefor in states with reticence 
toward the human rights regime which nonetheless possess ambitions regarding their own 
growth and global standing.  
 This potential also invites serious philosophical and ethical considerations. Suppose a 
state is unwilling or unlikely to provide a social good on the basis of its status as a right, but 
                                                      
75 See Philip Alston and Mary Robinson, Human Rights and Development: Toward Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); Amartya Sen, Development as freedom (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001).  
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receptive to pursuing it because doing so entails a tangible benefit. Should this second avenue be 
pursued? Is the fulfillment of a right for the “wrong” reasons preferable to leaving it unfulfilled, 
and moreover, can a state’s selective or disingenuous human rights compliance still be 
considered part of an effective human rights regime? This is particularly pertinent when such 
selective adherence functions as part of a broader violation. There is an unavoidable sense that 
focusing on development as a pragmatic method for the fulfillment of rights while relegating 
moral foundations could lead to a problematic erosion of the regime itself. The notion that the 
Cambodian government is conceivably manipulating the system by using development as human 
rights window dressing while simultaneously cracking down on political freedom is illustrative 
of such a hazard.  
 For this reason, development as a vehicle for rights in a broad sense appears too 
precarious to constitute a comprehensive approach to realizing human rights today. However, 
while it is not defensible a consistent method of pursuing human rights, in the case of education 
the benefits may outweigh — or at the very least parallel — the ethical concerns. Education is 
uniquely powerful not only as a reinforcer of other individual rights, but in strengthening the 
regime as a whole on a structural, philosophical, and empirical level.   
 
Education for rights: theories, models, and potential 
In a social and political sense, a satisfactory education provides a contextual understanding of the 
world and our roles therein that fosters a propensity for critical thought conducive, among other 
things, to understanding human rights and identifying their violation. In this way, knowledge is 
not only power, but empowerment. This notion has factored heavily into the human rights regime 
and its instruments since they were formed, as outlined in Chapter III. Article 26 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights defines the fulfillment of education as the “full development of the 
human personality” as well as the “strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”76. This understanding has been augmented by thinkers like Amartya Sen77 to include 
                                                      
76 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” accessed 9 January, 2017, https://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/.  
77 See Amartya Sen, Development as freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
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important and interrelated ideas about the role of education in expanding individual capabilities 
and strengthening personal autonomy, thus leading to increased freedom, which Sen views as the 
ultimate goal of development. Within the existing human rights regime, education has been 
established as an important “gateway” right, opening the door for the realization of myriad 
others.  
 It is my view that its potential extends beyond this. Education can engender a 
psychological transformation among its recipients that has the potential to facilitate meaningful, 
sustainable human rights change, particularly in transitional societies. This begins with a genuine 
shift in mentality among ordinary citizens, resulting in increased awareness and personal 
empowerment, and concludes in bottom-up social change, for instance through civic 
engagement. Such potential renders education uniquely effective for strengthening human rights  
and uniquely defensible as a political conception, ethical concerns notwithstanding.  
 How precisely might this work? The concept of social transformation through human 
rights education is rooted in the idea that a greater understanding of the world around us leads to 
better comprehension of our own roles and rights therein. This results in different expectations 
for what we are afforded. A human rights education should include two primary dimensions, 
both approached through critical pedagogy: the first historical, the second sociological. 
Developing an awareness of history can help facilitate a deeper understanding of how we have 
gotten where are. Digging into sociology helps us further make sense of why things function the 
way they do today. Taken together under a critical lens, the two provide a framework for a 
heuristic conception of human rights.  
 Learning from history does not merely entail factual recounting of past events. It also 
involves the acquisition of what Seixas and Peck call “historical significance”: “a relationship 
not only among events and people of the past, but also about the relationship of those people and 
events to us… organizing events in a narrative way that will show us something important about 
our position in the world”78. Extracting significance from history means moving beyond what 
                                                      
78 Seixas, Peter and Carla Peck, “Teaching Historical Thinking,” in Challenges and Prospects for Canadian Social 
Studies (Vancouver: Pacific Education Press, 2004): 111.  
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happened when and where to understanding why and how it came to pass. History ceases to be a 
static narrative, an immutable fate, and becomes humanly determined, dynamic, and changeable. 
In this way, a critical historical approach helps expand an understanding of human rights by 
examining the causes and origins of these rights in a way that is both normatively 
comprehensible and relevant to its audience. As André Keets puts it, this “constructs a 
relationship of ‘questioning’ between itself and the human rights universals it is tasked to 
legitimate… [and] allows for a reflexivity which is capable of questioning, from a social justice 
perspective, the assumptions, premises and suppositions of human rights itself”79  
Along with history, sociology is critical for successful human rights education. 
Understanding the fabric of social structures today allows for consideration of the ways in which 
they might be altered, and how a society may progress in the future. Human rights education, 
from this perspective, involves a process that allows recipients to imagine (and re-imagine) how 
social constructs underlie rights in a personal, day-to-day context  — what Felisa Tibbitts calls a 
“social change framework”80. This framework rests on the concept of Tibbitts’ “learning 
pyramid” — a set of three mutually reinforcing models for practicing human rights education: 
(1) values and awareness, (2) accountability, and (3) transformation (see Figure 1).  
The strategic goals for this model are socialization, cultural consensus, and normative 
institutionalization of human rights. The values and awareness model provides a foundation for
.                        
                                                      
79 Keet, André, “Plasticity, critical hope and the regeneration of human rights education,” in Discerning Critical 
Hopes in Education Practices (New York: Routledge, 2014): 70.  
80 Tibbitts, Felisa, “Understanding What We do: Emerging Models for Human Rights Rducation,” International 
Review of Education 48 (2002): 161.  
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the legal accountability model in the middle, and the psychological transformational model at the 
top81. One flaw within the existing human rights system illustrated in the context of Tibbitts’ 
learning pyramid is a disproportionate emphasis on accountability, which mainly involves 
institutionalizing human rights law. Without building human rights values and awareness the 
pyramid lacks a foundation; considering it done at the second stage leaves the transformation 
unfulfilled and the learning process incomplete. Transformation involves complex psychological 
shifts with an ambitious goal: the inception of a human rights mentality with new social norms 
and standards by and for all. It normalizes the most basic idea of human rights in a way that 
makes them logical, accessible, and defensible to the people they are tasked with protecting. This 
mentality strengthens human rights by facilitating personal empowerment that leads to social 
development — which, in turn, strengthens the original mentality, thereby creating a symbiotic 
triangular process of human rights education (see Figure 2).  
 It is difficult to overstate how vital this transformation is in fortifying human rights, 
particularly in sates with mixed human rights records. A heightened awareness of rights among a 
citizenry strengthens the regime by lending it legitimacy and respect where it might otherwise be 
viewed as alien or imposing. This is particularly important considering the common critique of 
the regime as detached from the lives and daily struggles of those it attempts to defend, making it 
a lofty, vague “other.” A human rights education that succeeds in linking rights to these struggles 
and offering them as a solution therefor opens the door to a genuine internalization of human
.                           
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rights. This in turn can engender meaningful social and political shifts, for instance through the 
mobilization of grassroots civic engagement in the pursuit of rights fulfillment. Over time, this 
can lead to the development of rights-focused and citizen-driven instruments and institutions.  
If expanded education — and more specifically, the incorporation of human rights 
education — can galvanize a mentality that catalyzes significant social change and human rights 
practices, then the stakes for improving education in transitional societies go well beyond 
fulfilling a right because it is a moral obligation, important as this may be. Education becomes a 
uniquely powerful instrument for realizing human rights. The transformative and developmental.                        
potential of human rights education — as well as its possible impediment as a development.                        
mandate — are illustrated in the case of Cambodia.  
 
Progress, potential, risks: development-mandated education in Cambodia 
In a country long guided by patrimonial deference for established cultural institutions and social 
hierarchies, the notion of citizens vying for their own rights is somewhat antithetical to the 
Cambodian tradition82. Yet today, things are changing. As education and civic engagement have 
increased, support for Hun Sen and the CPP has dropped. The 2013 elections were followed by 
months of protest. The outrage swelled again in July 2016 following the assassination of 
prominent political commentator and vocal CPP critic Kem Ley, which the regime was heavily 
suspected of orchestrating83. Today, there are predictions that the CNRP opposition party could 
win the upcoming 2018 elections in a clean race84. This is a drastic shift resulting from myriad 
causes, not least among them an expanded education system and the inclusion of a human rights 
curriculum. 
 Under heavy international guidance, Cambodia has moved to incorporate human rights 
education into its expanded curriculum since reform began in 1994. The Ministry of Education, 
                                                      
82 See Simon Springer, Cambodia’s Neoliberal Order: Violence, Authoritarianism, and the Contestation of Public 
Space (London: Routledge, 2010).  
83 “Cambodia’s Deadly Politics,” accessed 23 May, 2017, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2017/01/cambodia-deadly-politics-170111105925039.html/.  
84 Pinol, Marc, “Cambodia’s Commune Elections: A Barometer for 2018,” The Diplomat, accessed 6 June, 2017; 
Thul, Prak Chan, “Cambodian opposition makes gains in local elections,” Reuters, Accessed 6 June, 2017. 
40 
 
Youth and Sport developed a joint effort with the non-governmental Cambodian Institute of 
Human Rights (CIHR) entitled Human Rights Teaching Methodology. The program works to 
promote rights through the inclusion of human rights education in the national curriculum, in the 
hope that this will “rebuild human rights and restore traditional values from the ground up by 
educating all the generations to come”85. The methodology stipulates that rights education be 
taught as its own subject as well as integrated into others, such as reading and literature. 
Additionally, in recent years Cambodian schools have begun to include a measure of history 
education as it pertains to the deadly Khmer Rouge rule — a departure from the previous 
“amnesia approach” that its history lessons took regarding the atrocities committed during this 
time86. 
 Civic engagement in Cambodia has drastically increased in the 2010s, in what a 2015 
Oxfam report calls a “turning point in social, economic and political development”87 in the 
country. This increase can be traced to the 2013 elections, wherein the surprising uptick in 
support for the CNRP opposition party was attributed to “massive mobilization of youth support, 
online campaigns for change, and citizen desire for change”88. These culturally unorthodox 
demands for change, and the extent to which they impacted the outcome of the election, shook 
Hun Sen, the CPP, and the Cambodian status quo. Despite the fact that the resulting reforms 
have proven limited at best, the process by which they have emerged — that is, discontent 
manifested through citizen engagement to vocalize a collective will — appears a more 
organically democratic development than anything seen previously in Cambodia. Caroline 
Hughes attributes the prior absence of this “bottom up” citizen engagement in Cambodia to the 
failure of democratic transition and genuine human rights respect in the early 1990s; she deems 
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their promulgation in the past a mere diplomatic mandate89. The spread of apparently “real” 
human rights internalization and the emergence of grassroots civic engagement and genuine 
political dissent mark suggest an unlikely resurgence in democratic possibility in Cambodia. The 
notion that this transformation could be ascribed, in some measure, to increased education, lends 
this right a utility that renders its fulfillment essential. 
  However, while it is important in the given context to identify the potential and the 
subsequent urgency of education in strengthening human rights, it is equally pivotal to recognize 
the complexity of the social and political shifts that underlie such a process. The myriad, 
ambiguous, and often convoluted factors affecting these processes leave little room for empirical 
correlations or straightforward causations. This is especially true in the context of post-
authoritarian, transitional societies such as Cambodia. In an environment where longstanding 
social, cultural, and political structures and norms are suddenly in flux, it is difficult to attribute 
these shifts to any one factor. Rather, a number of circumstances and influences are at play. In 
Cambodia, this includes expanded education but also significant demographic shifts, with scores 
of Cambodians flocking to urban centers for employment opportunities, and technological 
advances such as increased Internet access stimulating an unprecedented flow of unfiltered 
information. One common point among these contributing facets is increased awareness, which 
no single factor can fairly be attributed with facilitating.  
Additionally, the potential of development as a vehicle for education and a catalyst for 
social change must be reconciled with the reality of its shortcomings. In Cambodia, the 
proclaimed “turning point” of social and political change arrived years after the country’s initial 
commitment to development under the auspices of the United Nations in the 1990s — including 
expanded education and a mandated human rights curriculum. These changes have been deemed 
partial at best and fictitious at worst, but they satisfied the requirements of the country’s new 
diplomatic mandate and gave the government valuable indicators to point to as proof of the 
country’s development. This sheds light on an important flaw in the premise of development as a 
vehicle for rights: development initiatives in transitioning societies are not always conducive — 
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and may even be unfavorable — to the transformations that they aim to facilitate because they 
risk sustaining a counterproductive illusion of progress.  
 In the Kingdom of Cambodia, the reality that expanded education and human rights 
adherence have functioned largely as diplomatic mandates since the government’s formation in 
1993 has led to the clouding of these concepts in their dissemination. This has resulted in a lack 
of legitimacy and a barrier for internalization among much of the public, including among young 
people receiving a human rights education. A 2010 report by the United Nations Development 
Program on youth civic engagement in Cambodia found that although engagement itself was on 
the rise, levels of knowledge and awareness about the topic itself were mixed at best:  
Many young people who had heard… terms did not know how to define them. ‘Human rights’ was 
a universally familiar term with mixed interpretations. When those who had heard ‘human rights’ 
were asked what the term meant, one fourth of them did not know. Nearly half referred to some 
form of assurance or principle of freedom…. ‘Civic engagement’ was less known. The two-third 
of young people who had heard the term gave a range of definitions about some type of responses 
to problems. A third of those who had heard of it could not define it. Formal training about 
‘democracy/civic engagement’ was limited to a quarter of the full sample, of whom virtually all 
(94%) had been taught at school”90.  
 These findings indicate qualitative challenges within human rights education stemming 
from development mandates. A lack of real fulfillment of the learning outcomes set forth by the 
aforementioned pedagogical models leaves Cambodians with perplexing half-definitions and 
general confusion about what these heavily expounded concepts even mean. The half-hearted 
realization of diplomatic mandates tied to development initiatives poses a hazard in cultivating a 
false appearance of progress, which can be detrimental to truly strengthening rights in that it 
presents a façade of improvement that can slow or altogether obstruct meaningful change.  
 This challenge to development-mandated education is by no means exclusive to Cambodia. 
In neighboring Vietnam, which liberalized its economy in 1986 and subsequently adopted an 
ambitious new education system, there is a serious gap between academic certification and actual 
knowledge and skills. This has been attributed to lacking internalization of the new system 
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among both teachers and students; the former demand little and distribute disproportionately 
high marks, and the latter have been charged with pervasive cultural “passiveness”91. In both 
instances, education is viewed less as a process of acquiring knowledge and more as a societal 
checkmark of sorts. Still, the system is in place, diplomas are distributed, and it is difficult to 
establish whether education in Vietnam might actually be suffering more under this fractured 
system, considering the all-important international indicators are present. In this way, although 
the Vietnamese case operates within a vastly different context, it still underscores the risks 
evident in Cambodia, namely that a development-mandated education system that is increasingly 
accessible but qualitatively poor can actually be detrimental to social, economic, and political 
conditions in a transitioning society. To remedy this, qualitative improvements and reliable 
methods for measuring subsequent results are needed.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
Can development, as a political incentive, serve as a tenable vehicle for human rights, 
and how might this strengthen the human rights regime in the twenty-first century? In the case of 
Cambodia, is the pursuit of education for the purpose of development, economic growth, and 
political legitimacy a viable and ethically acceptable avenue for expanding rights? How is this 
approach harmful or helpful to strengthening the human rights regime today? 
 This work offers three related conclusions to these inquiries. Firstly, a political conception 
of human rights, in the context of development as a vehicle for these rights, is not universally 
defensible, even on a theoretical plane. It carries too much ethical baggage and too many 
empirical risks. Pushing too far into pragmatic realizations of rights while relegating their moral 
foundation risks an amoral transactionalism that threatens to erode the regime altogether.  
 Secondly, while this approach should not be applied to rights generally, an exception can 
and should be made concerning education, on the basis of its potential in effectuating a more 
robust human rights regime. In the context of transitional societies, education can constitute a 
uniquely effective method for strengthening human rights by facilitating a psychological 
transformation that has the power to catalyze meaningful, bottom-up social change. This begins 
with the inclusion of a human rights curriculum which can fosters learning outcomes favorable to 
strengthened human rights, as detailed in the provided pedagogical models.  
 Finally, although education does provide a compelling theoretical avenue for strengthening 
human rights in the twenty-first century, it is difficult at this stage to delineate its empirical 
potential, particularly in transitioning societies such as Cambodia. Although expanded education 
is connected to the budding social and political “turning point” in Cambodia, these changes have 
been informed by myriad, interrelated factors. It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascribe 
disproportionate credit to any single factor, including education. Thus, the correlation I aimed to 
establish between increased education and strengthened human rights at the outset of the the 
project has proven neither as straightforward nor as empirically defensible as initially 
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envisioned. The increase in education in Cambodia since 1993 certainly appears to have 
contributed positively to political and social shifts in the country today. However, the extent to 
which the new human rights curriculum has facilitated the psychological transformation 
proposed in the pedagogical models is, for now, unknowable. Future work on the topic could 
narrow this gap by incorporating an empirical assessment of human rights education learning 
outcomes in Cambodia through on-site fieldwork including surveys, focus groups, and in-depth 
interviews.  
Despite these gaps, the potential of education underlying the premise of the work 
remains. While not categorically demonstrable as a direct causation of greater human rights 
fulfillment, education does provide a possibility, and indeed the probability, of a human rights 
mentality with the potential to effectuate a stronger, more organic human rights regime by 
increasing public awareness and facilitating social change. Such change, in the form of civic 
engagement, can result in grassroots demands for human rights, thus strengthening the regime in 
transitioning societies and as a whole. Complexities in realizing or delineating its full potential 
notwithstanding, this potential, in the watershed moment of the human rights regime today, is a 
critical step in looking beyond existing methods to new avenues for sustainable change. 
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